Working Papers

Public Policy and Private-Sector Prosocial Motives: The Case of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Job Market Paper)          Paper

Presentations: JARS 2024 and University of Oxford

This paper shows that the effectiveness of public policies depends on their interactions with existing private-sector prosocial motives. Examining the adoption of greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets by some U.S. states, I find that firms in these states face decreased shareholder pressure post-adoption, evidenced by fewer emission-related shareholder proposals and lower voting support rates. Accounting for emission scale variability across facilities, these state-level targets appear ineffective in reducing corporate emissions. Overall, the findings suggest that public interventions can, in certain circumstances, crowd out private-sector prosocial efforts and thereby undermine their intended policy effects.

Powerful CEOs in Uncertain Times: Survival of the Fittest          Paper  Slides 

Presentations: AEA  2024, AFA Poster 2023, University of Oxford (Best PhD Paper Award)

Contrary to the conventional focus on the costs of excessive CEO power, this study investigates whether powerful CEOs are beneficial and desirable under uncertainty. The evidence shows that powerful CEOs have a lower dismissal rate in uncertain times. As they exhibit better performance but no increased compensation, powerful CEOs are likely retained optimally for their effectiveness rather than by entrenched power. To mitigate endogeneity concerns surrounding CEO power, this paper utilizes the onset of COVID-19 pandemic as an unanticipated sudden spike in uncertainty, during which CEO power is unlikely to adjust swiftly to external conditions due to stickiness. The study proposes two potential mechanisms explaining why powerful CEOs are more effective under uncertainty: their willingness to share information with the board and their capability to take swift action. Overall, this study challenges the view that CEO power is always manipulative and detrimental.

Equity-Based Compensation and the Timing of Share Repurchases: The Role of the Corporate Calendar, with Ingolf Dittmann, Amy Yazhu Li, and Stefan Obernberger          Paper  Slides

2nd round R&R at the Journal of Accounting and Economics

Presentations: AFA 2023, E(uropean)FA 2023, NFA 2023, ECGC 2023, SFS Cavalcade Asia-Pacific 2022, AAA 2022, DGF 2022, Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Amsterdam, and University of Oxford

This study examines whether the CEO uses share repurchases to sell her equity grants at inflated stock prices, a concern regularly voiced in politics and media. We document that the timing of buyback programs, like the timing of equity-based compensation, is largely determined by the corporate calendar through earnings announcement dates and blackout periods, inducing a spurious positive correlation between share repurchases and equity-based compensation. Accounting for the corporate calendar, share repurchases are no longer correlated with the granting and vesting of equity. The CEO is more likely to buy equity when the firm announces a buyback program and less likely to sell equity when the firm actually buys back shares.  Equity compensation increases the CEO's propensity to launch a buyback program when it benefits long-term shareholder value. Our results suggest a novel channel of how equity-based compensation aligns the interests of shareholders with those of the CEO.