Working Papers

Public Policy and Private-Sector Prosocial Motives: The Case of Greenhouse Gas Emissions          Paper

Runner-Up, 5th Annual Sustainable Finance in Fixed Income Research Competition

Presentations: Exeter Sustainable Finance Conference 2026 (scheduled), ARCS Annual Research Conference 2026 (scheduled), CREDIT Venice 2025, Future Scholars in Finance Forum 2025, Liechtenstein Workshop of Sustainable Finance, 3rd London Political Finance Workshop, Sixth Edinburgh Corporate Finance Conference, Hong Kong-Shenzhen Joint Finance Research Workshop 2025, HKU Governance and Sustainability PhD Workshop 2025, FMA European Doctoral Student Consortium 2025, Junior Academics Research Seminars in Finance 2024-25, Xiamen University, Nanyang Technological University, City University of Hong Kong, Lingnan University, Peking University, and the University of Oxford

Do public policies necessarily foster private-sector prosocial behaviour? I show that their effectiveness depends on interactions with private-sector prosocial motives. Exploiting the adoption of greenhouse gas reduction targets in nine U.S. states, I find that firms in adopting states exhibit decreased voluntary motives to reduce emissions, as evidenced by fewer emission-related shareholder proposals and lower voting support. Furthermore, I find no evidence of reduced corporate emissions relative to control firms. Heterogeneity analyses indicate that the policy is less effective for firms with stronger pre-policy voluntary motives. Overall, the results suggest that certain public interventions can inadvertently crowd out private-sector efforts, thereby undermining their objectives.

Powerful CEOs in Uncertain Times: Survival of the Fittest          Paper  Slides 

Presentations: AEA  2024, AFA Poster 2023, University of Oxford (Best PhD Paper Award)

Contrary to the conventional focus on the costs of excessive CEO power, this study investigates whether powerful CEOs are beneficial and desirable under uncertainty. The evidence shows that powerful CEOs have a lower dismissal rate in uncertain times. As they exhibit better performance but no increased compensation, powerful CEOs are likely retained optimally for their effectiveness rather than by entrenched power. To mitigate endogeneity concerns surrounding CEO power, this paper utilizes the onset of COVID-19 pandemic as an unanticipated sudden spike in uncertainty, during which CEO power is unlikely to adjust swiftly to external conditions due to stickiness. The study proposes two potential mechanisms explaining why powerful CEOs are more effective under uncertainty: their willingness to share information with the board and their capability to take swift action. Overall, this study challenges the view that CEO power is always manipulative and detrimental.

Publications

Equity-Based Compensation and the Timing of Share Repurchases: The Role of the Corporate Calendar, with Ingolf Dittmann, Amy Yazhu Li, and Stefan Obernberger          Journal of Accounting and Economics (2025): 101798.          Paper  Slides

Featured in: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance